DERIVATIVE WORKS
Copyright law has long drawn a distinction between "derivative" works, over which the copyright owner has exclusive control, and "transformative" works, which are considered to be "fair use" and not subject to control by the author of the original piece.
The Copyright Act defines a "derivative work" as: "a work based upon one or more pre-existing works, such as a translation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed or adapted." 17 U.S.C Section 106(2).
The Second Circuit teaches that: "Although derivative works that are subject to the author's copyright transform the original work into a new mode of presentation, such works--unlike works of fair use--take expression for purposes that are not "transformative."
As early as 1802, Lord Ellenborough wrote of the need, while protecting copyrighted material, to allow others to build upon it when he wrote, "while I shall think myself bound to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles upon science." Carey v. Kearsley, 4 Esp.168, 170. Forty years later, in America, Justice Story observed that the cases required one to "look to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work." 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (No.4,901) (CCD Mass. 1841).
Here are the words of the U.S. Supreme Court:
"The first factor in a
fair use enquiry is "the purpose and character of the use,
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes." § 107(1). This factor
draws on Justice Story's formulation, "the nature and objects
of the selections made." Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas., at 348.
The enquiry here may be guided by the examples given in the preamble
to § 107, looking to whether the use is for criticism, or
comment, or news reporting, and the like, see § 107. The
central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story's
words, whether the new work merely "supersedes the objects"
of the original creation, Folsom v. Marsh, (supra) , at 348; accord,
Harper & Row, (supra), at 562 ("supplanting" the
original), or instead adds something new, with a further purpose
or different character, altering the first with new expression,
meaning, or message; it asks, in other words, whether and to what
extent the new work is "transformative." Leval 1111.
Although such transformative use is not absolutely necessary for
a finding of fair use, Sony, (supra) , at 455, n. 40, *fn11 the
goal of copyright, to promote science and the arts, is generally
furthered by the creation of transformative works. Such works
thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine's guarantee of
breathing space within the confines of copyright, see, e. g.,
Sony, (supra) , at 478-480 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting), and the
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance
of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh against a
finding of fair use." Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569 (1994).
The point here is that if a new work merely recasts the copyrighted material in a different medium, then it is "derivative" and infringing. But if the later work builds upon the earlier version and adds new content, then it is "transformative" and non-infringing.